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I. INTRODUCTION 
For years, large corporations have engaged in business operations in foreign 
countries to exploit the natural resources available abroad and to achieve higher 
overall profits by operating at costs substantially lower than these businesses would 
incur in North America.  In the process, citizens of underdeveloped foreign countries 
are often subjected to gross abuses of their human rights, suffered at the hands of 
large multinational corporations and the host countries’ governments and military 
forces.  Sadly, this horrific reality still holds true today.  People are being tortured, 
raped, and killed at the hands of entities that are in many instances funded by these 
multinational corporations.  Some individuals have had to endure slavery.  Others 
have had to endure forced impregnation.   
Until recently, victims of such heinous crimes have been capable of bringing 
claims against corporations under the Alien Tort Claims Act,1 (“ATS”) in hopes of 
receiving a favorable judgment, or, in most instances, a large settlement against the 
corporation for the harm suffered.  However, in its September 2010 decision Kiobel 
                                                 
† J.D. 2012, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1940) [hereinafter ATS] (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States”). 
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v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit concluded what no other court has: 
that corporations are categorically not subject to ATS liability.2  In Kiobel, Nigerian 
residents filed a putative class action under the ATS, claiming that Dutch, British, and 
Nigerian corporations engaging in oil exploration and production aided and abetted3 the 
Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses in violation of the law of 
nations.  The Second Circuit relied on established precedent in holding that customary 
international law governs the scope of ATS liability.4  The court then introduced a new 
concept to ATS jurisprudence, holding that corporate defendants are not subject to 
liability for any claims brought under the ATS because they are not subjects of 
international law.5  This concept is indeed a novel one because other courts have 
consistently held that corporations could be liable under the ATS if its conduct did in fact 
reach the level of an international law violation.6 
The text of the ATS makes no distinctions as to what class of defendants may be held 
liable under the ATS.  ATS cases typically yield discussion of whether a specific offense 
rises to the level of a violation of the law of nations.  In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second 
Circuit was presented with the novel issue of whether courts may exercise ATS 
jurisdiction over private individuals (opposed to ATS jurisdiction over governmental or 
state actors only).7  The Kadic court ultimately held that the ATS does apply to private 
individuals because some offenses violate international law, regardless of who committed 
them.8  Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction arise in many, if not all, ATS cases 
involving corporations.  When presented with such challenges, courts have consistently 
exercised jurisdiction over corporations when plaintiffs allege the corporation
                                                 
2 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010). 
3 Aiding and abetting is and has been a common mechanism for courts to exercise jurisdiction 
under the ATS over private individuals and corporations by establishing a relationship between 
the individual or corporation and a state actor committing human rights violations against the 
plaintiffs.  I will, however, discuss the concept of aider and abettor liability and its applicable 
standard later in this article.  See generally Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of 
Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008); 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 260-264 (2d Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) and cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010).  
4 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128-31; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Filártiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
5 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 147-48. 
6 Although no court has explicitly held that a particular corporation was liable to a plaintiff in an 
ATS suit, courts have consistently and deliberately left the possibility open for such claims if 
brought under the right circumstances. I will discuss these cases in further detail later in this 
article. See generally Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009) (court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim 
on substantive grounds, but explicitly acknowledged that corporate defendants are subject to 
liability under the ATS); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (court 
rejected defendant’s argument that corporate defendants were excluded from the ATS). 
7 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
8 Id. at 239. 
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was in a relationship with the government.9  As the Kadic court instructs, certain 
offenses are so heinous that no governmental relationship is necessary to impose 
liability under the ATS.10   
Secondary or assessorial liability, most commonly invoked under the aiding and 
abetting doctrine, has been and remains an accepted method of bringing non-state 
actors within the purview of the ATS, even in instances when the claim may not 
otherwise entitle the plaintiff to relief from that particular defendant.  Many 
commentators claim that the bar for proving assessorial ATS violations has been 
raised substantially in recent years.11  Nevertheless, liability under the aiding and 
abetting doctrine is still an option for victims of human rights violations who can 
successfully prove such violations were purposely instigated by corporations.12  The 
Kiobel court erroneously held that corporations, categorically, couldn’t be subject to 
ATS suits because corporations are not subject to customary international law.  The 
Kiobel court’s holding was incorrect, however, because many courts have exercised 
ATS jurisdiction over corporate defendants using the aiding and abetting doctrine.13  
 Prior to Kiobel, no U.S. court has ever held that corporations cannot be held 
liable for violations of international norms.  Although it is also true that no court has 
ever actually found for the plaintiff in an ATS suit against a corporation, numerous 
courts, both prior and subsequent to the Kiobel decision, have been presented with 
the issue of corporate ATS liability.  These courts have repeatedly acknowledged 
that corporations may be held liable under the ATS under the right set of 
circumstances.14  The Kiobel court went against the weight of authority and 
effectively removed an established and effective means of recourse for victims of 
offenses committed in violation of the law of nations.  The Kiobel court de-
emphasized the significance of federal court decisions that demonstrate, under 
various circumstances, that corporations may be held liable for ATS violations.  
Because Kiobel removed corporate defendants from the scope of civil liability under 
the ATS, and because a corporation is not a person who can be charged, convicted,
                                                 
9 See generally Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 
319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (court denies the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment where plaintiffs allege that two oil companies directed and aided the Nigerian 
government in violating plaintiffs’ rights). 
10 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232. 
 
11 Jonathan Drimmer & Michael Lieberman, Drimmer and Lieberman on Talisman Energy 
and the Alien Tort Statute: The Continuing Threat of Secondary Liability, 2010 EMERGING 
ISSUES 5182 (citing Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 260-64 (“[The Talisman court] held that 
for a corporation to be liable under the ATS, plaintiffs must show the defendants purposely 
acted to help the principal commit a human rights violation.  A corporation’s mere 
knowledge that its actions contributed to the principal’s commission of the offense, held the 
court, is insufficient”)). 
 
12 Id. 
 
13 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145; see generally Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 260-264; Khulumani 
v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[In that] Circuit, a plaintiff 
may plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability under the [ATS]”); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (court reversed the dismissal of the ATS suit because 
the plaintiffs properly alleged that the drug company’s violations of international law were 
done in concert with the Nigerian government). 
 
14 See generally Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d 1252; Flomo, 643 F.3d 
1013; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 260-64; Pfizer, 562 F.3d at 188. 
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and imprisoned for a crime, it effectively placed large multinational corporations 
above the law.  
In Part II of this article, I will provide a necessary overview of the history of the 
ATS and its evolution into modern-day relevance.  I will discuss the state of ATS 
law as it pertains to corporations in Part III.  Lastly, I will discuss the Kiobel decision 
in detail, describe how the Second Circuit erred in its holding, and suggest that the 
Supreme Court reverse the Kiobel decision on appeal in Part IV. 
 
II. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:  
FROM 1789 TO FILÁRTIGA AND BEYOND 
 
A. Origin 
 
 The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATS”) provides that “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
15  The first Congress 
passed the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.16  Scholars have surmised that 
the purpose of the ATS was to “ensure the young state’s full membership in the 
international community” by ensuring the rights of foreign dignitaries.
17  The ATS 
“guarantee[d] that foreign ambassadors [and] ships protected by international law 
would have a cause of action in federal court for violations of [these] rights”
18  
America’s founders understood that without this protection, the newly-formed 
United States would not be welcomed and/or trusted in the “international 
community” of sovereign nations.
19 
Few cases were brought under the ATS from the time of its codification in 1789 
until the 1980s.  Only four judicial opinions were issued regarding the ATS in nearly 
the first two centuries following the statute’s enactment.20  The first of these opinions 
was recorded in 1795, where the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina granted jurisdiction under the ATS in a dispute over the title of slaves 
aboard a captured enemy vessel in Bolchos v. Darrel.21  After discussing the issue as  
to whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case, the District Court Judge 
concluded: “[A]s the 9th section of the judiciary act of congress [Act Sept. 24, 1789, 
1 Stat. 77] gives this court concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit  
 
 
                                                 
15 See generally ATS, supra note 1. 
16 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. Because the Act was passed as part of the larger Judiciary Act of 
1789, it does not have a name of its own.  However, commentators and U.S. courts have 
commonly referred to § 1350 the Alien Tort Claims Act or the Alien Tort Statute. 
17 Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational 
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359, 365 
(1999). 
18 Id. 
19 Kelsy Deye, Can Corporations Be Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 94 KY. 
L.J. 649, 650-51 (2005-06). 
20 Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort Statute to Provide 
Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 124 
(2007). 
21 Id.; Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795). 
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courts of the United States where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of 
nations, or a treaty of the United States, I dismiss all doubt upon this point.”22   
In 1908, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed in O'Reilly De 
Camara v. Brooke, the possible applicability of the ATS in a case where a U.S. 
officer was accused of illegally seizing a Spanish woman’s property in a foreign 
nation.23  In that case, the plaintiff alleged that she had the right by title to slaughter 
cattle in a city-owned slaughterhouse and receive compensation for the same.  This 
title to slaughter cattle was incident to the office of Sheriff of Havana.  When the 
United States took power in Cuba and the Spanish sovereignty ended, the office of 
the sheriff ended also.  She argued that her rights were violated when, although the 
office of the sheriff no longer existed, the Governor of Havana declared that the title 
was and void and did not compensate the plaintiff and her family.  The Court stated 
in relevant part: “In any event, the question hardly can be avoided whether the 
supported tort is ‘a tort only in violation of the law of nations' or of the treaty with 
Spain.”
24   
In that case, the distinction between whether the alleged tort was done in 
violation of the law of nations or of the treaty with Spain was significant, because 
pursuant to a treaty entered into with Spain, the plaintiff would lose any claim 
brought against a United States military official.25  The United States Congress thus 
removed the Plaintiff’s ability to sue the Governor for tort when it ratified the 
Governor’s action.  The plaintiff later argued that her rights, which were violated, 
were so fundamental that it would be a violation of international law for them to be 
displaced, even if the action was ratified by Congress.26  The Court ultimately 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because her contention that her fundamental rights 
were violated was not the basis on which jurisdiction was asserted.27  From the 
opinion, an inference can be drawn that had the plaintiff alleged that the violation of 
her rights constituted a violation of the law of nations, the Court would have to 
exercise jurisdiction over the matter. 
The next recorded judicial reference to the ATS did not come until 1961 in Adra 
v. Clift, when the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland concluded that in a 
custody dispute between two aliens, wrongfully withholding custody of a child 
constituted an actionable tort.28  The court also found that using an illegal passport to 
move the child away from her father constituted a violation of the law of nations.29   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810 (emphasis added). 
23 O'Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908). 
24 Id. at 51 (emphasis added). 
25 Id. at 50. 
26 Id. at 51. 
 
27 Id. 
28 Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-64 (D. Md. 1961). 
29 Id. at 864-64. 
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The court’s holding in this case was particularly significant because, as I will discuss 
later in this article, it effectively expanded the scope of the ATS to encompass 
private individuals and newly discovered violations of international law.30   
 
B. ATS Claims: A Modern Application 
 
History shows that Congress only contemplated the ATS to extend to a “modest” 
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.  These were originally 
contemplated as offences against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and 
piracy.31  It was understood by eighteenth-century courts that violations of the law of 
nations specifically referred to these types of actions.32  However, after nearly two 
hundred years of existence, the ATS received new life, and its scope expanded.   
A 1980 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
gave birth to an extensive, modern wave of ATS jurisprudence.33  In the landmark 
case of Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s 
dismissal of a wrongful death by torture complaint for want of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.34  In Filártiga, the appellants brought an action alleging that the appellee 
kidnapped, tortured, and killed their 17-year old relative in retaliation for his father’s 
political actions and beliefs.35  The key issue in this case was the definition of the 
law of nations.  In finding that jurisdiction was proper under the “rarely invoked” 
ATS, the court adopted an “evolving” standard of the law of nations.
36  The court 
held that the appellee’s alleged conduct was committed under the color of 
governmental authority and in violation of universally accepted norms of 
international law, therefore subjecting the appellee to liability under the ATS.37  The 
Filártiga court recognized that over the course of centuries, new technology 
emerges, relationships among sovereign nations change, and thus new conflicts arise.   
 
 
                                                 
30 In the last of these four pre “modern-era” ATS cases, decided in 1975, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that injuries resulting from the evacuation of children from South Vietnam by the 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service could be addressed using the ATS.  See 
generally Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975); Dhooge, supra note 
20, at 171 n.4. 
 
31 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718-20.  In this case, the first case in which the Supreme Court 
addressed in detail the history and modern applicability of the ATS and how claims brought 
under the statute were to be scrutinized, the Court took a historical approach to determining 
Congress’ intent when the ATS was enacted.  To date, this is the only Supreme Court 
decision rendered with significant emphasis on the ATS.  Because this decision is still the 
chief authority on the issue of ATS liability, the historical inferences it made are 
unanimously accepted and adopted by U.S. district and circuit courts. 
32 Id. at 720. 
33 Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
34 Id. at 890. 
35 Id. at 878.  Each of the appellants and the appellee were citizens of Paraguay. 
36 Id. at 878, 879 n.3; Dhooge, supra note 20, at 124.  
37 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. “Under the color of official authority” for these purposes 
refers to acts done by a state official. 
10 
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Furthermore, it must be inferred that Congress intended the ATS, like every other 
statute, to have practical effect, and not be placed on the shelves of time and history 
because of its uselessness.38  Thus, Filártiga moved the ATS jurisprudence out of the 
box that historically limited its scope to the “modest” set of offenses that were 
considered violations of the law of nations when the statute was enacted in 1789, by 
declaring that the law of nations necessarily evolves as the times change.39  This 
“evolving” standard of what constitutes the law of nations was later recognized by 
the Supreme Court, and has been adopted by all of the ATS cases to follow.40  This 
demonstrates that modern ATS jurisprudence is not restricted to recognizing the law 
of nations as it existed in 1789 (at the time the ATS was enacted), but rather as it 
evolves over time, giving credence to the idea that liability under the ATS should 
extend to corporations. 
 “Modern application has provided some assistance in adjudicating claims under 
the [ATS].”
41  In determining what makes up the law of nations, courts “must 
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists 
among the nations of the world today.”
42  Virtually all nations have renounced 
official torture, but many agreements have placed a “universal condemnation” on 
torture of any sort.43  Although torture wasn’t originally contemplated as an 
international law violation when the ATS was enacted, it nonetheless violates 
“established norms of the international law of human rights,” and hence modern-day 
international law.44  In effect, the court found that the ATS allowed for adjudication 
of modern customary international law violations, including human rights violations. 
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued its only significant ATS 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.45  In Sosa, a Mexican man filed suit in a U.S. 
district court, alleging that the Drug Enforcement Administration had arranged his 
arrest in Mexico for a criminal trial in the U.S., for which he was later acquitted.46  
The plaintiff further alleged that another Mexican person was involved in his 
abduction and was therefore liable under the ATS for violating international law.47   
 
 
                                                 
38 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719, 730. 
 
39 See generally Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
 
40 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
41 Sonia Jimenez, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Tool for Repairing Ethically Challenged 
U.S. Corporations, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 721, 734 (2004). 
42 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 881.  The court relied on the United Nations Charter in determining 
that the manner in which nations treat its own citizens is a matter of international concern.  
USCS U.N. Charter art. 55.  The Court quoted the relevant part of Art. 55 of the charter, 
which provided: “[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . . the United 
Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion. Id. 
 
43 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 880.  
44 Id.  
45 Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
46 Id. at 698-99. 
 
47 Id.  
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The Court ultimately held, in relevant part, that the individual was not entitled to 
damages under the ATS because his claim was not based on a valid international-law 
norm.48  Furthermore, the Court established that the ATS grants jurisdiction for torts 
committed in violation of international law, but does not create for plaintiffs a new 
cause of action.49  
The notion that ATS provides grounds for jurisdiction, but does not provide a 
new cause of action purported by the Supreme Court in Sosa is essentially what the  
controversy over corporate liability is based upon.  The Kiobel court erroneously 
likened corporate liability to a new cause of action, when corporate liability is 
instead a jurisdictional issue, for which the ATS may be invoked according to Sosa.50  
Essentially, plaintiffs in ATS actions must satisfy three fundamental elements:  
plaintiff must “(1) be an alien, (2) claim a tort, (3) that violates a rule in a U.S. treaty 
or customary international law that carries personal liability.”
51  Whether a claim is 
actionable under the ATS “must be gauged against the current state of international 
law, looking to those sources [courts] have long, albeit cautiously recognized.”
52  
The Supreme Court has adopted the notion that the state of international law is ever 
evolving, and courts must look to modern norms in adjudicating ATS cases.53   
While the elements of an ATS claim remain consistent, the Supreme Court has 
imposed a heightened specificity requirement in determining whether a particular 
norm constitutes international law.54  The Sosa test requires that claims based on the 
present-day law of nations must “rest on a norm of international character accepted 
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of 
the 18th-century paradigms [the Supreme Court has] recognized.”55  Although claims 
alleging violations of the law of nations will be greeted with considerable scrutiny, 
plaintiffs who can successfully prove that such actions violated a specifically defined 
and widely accepted international norm will have their claims entertained by federal 
courts.56  
 
                                                 
48 Id. at 734-35 
49 Id. at 738. 
 
50 See generally Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111. 
 
51 Paul E. Hagen, Anthony L. Michaels, The Alien Tort Statute: A Primer on Liability for 
Multinational Corporations, SK046 ALI-ABA 121, 125 (May 5-6, 2005).  These elements 
were derived directly from the text of § 1350, with the slight modification to Element 3.  
This commentary purports to clarify what constitutes the law of nations in light of Sosa.  
“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the 
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law 
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
52 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733. 
53 See generally id. (adopting Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876). 
54 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33. 
55 Id. at 725 (this test requires that the international norm on which an alleged violation rests 
must be as specifically defined and widely accepted as offences against ambassadors, 
violations of safe conduct, and piracy were in 1789). 
56 See id. at 714. 
12 
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III. THE GREAT DEBATE: CORPORATIONS MAY BE HELD LIABLE  
UNDER THE ATS 
 
A. Beginning of the ATS as Applied to Corporations 
 
 In the modern era of ATS litigation, courts have found themselves 
increasingly involved in civil suits in which plaintiffs seek ATS relief from 
corporations.  In 1997, when a suit against a large U.S.-based oil company was filed 
on behalf of 14 Burmese villagers under the ATS for alleged human rights 
violations, a new way of attacking corporations was discovered.57  In the landmark 
case of Doe v. Unocal, the complaint alleged that the defendant corporation paid the 
brutal Burmese military to provide security assistance for the construction of the 
Yadana (gas) Pipeline project and thus entered into a joint venture with them.58  
Plaintiffs allege that the military committed multiple human rights violations 
including forced labor, rape, torture and murder in connection with the pipeline 
project.59  Plaintiffs claimed that Unocal was aware that these human rights 
violations were being committed by the military and therefore was liable for these 
violations.60   
The U.S. District Court denied Unocal’s motion to dismiss, holding that because 
plaintiffs allege that Unocal was jointly engaged with the state officials committing 
the violations, subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under the ATS.61  The District 
Court later dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment, holding that 
Plaintiffs failed to prove that Unocal engaged in state activity or controlled the 
Burmese military.62  These claims were dismissed, not because the ATS didn’t 
provide subject-matter jurisdiction over corporate defendants in general, but rather 
because these plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden of proof.63  Unocal opened the 
door for numerous future suits involving corporations by establishing that 
corporations may be held liable under the ATS. 
 
 
B. Individuals May Be Held Liable Under the ATS,  
Therefore Corporations May Be Held Liable 
 
 
                                                 
57 See generally Mark D. Kielsgard, Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality, 36 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 185 (2005) (sources vary as to the exact number of Burmese citizens 
involved in the suit, ranging from 14 to 17); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom; Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th 
Cir. 2002) on reh'g en banc; Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
58 Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85. 
59 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 939-40. 
60 Katherine Gallagher, Civil Litigation and Transnational Business: An Alien Tort Statute 
Primer, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 745, 750 (2010). 
61 Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891.  
62 Doe I, 395 F.3d at 943-44 (on appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial 
of the defendant-corporation’s motion to dismiss, and reversed summary judgment, holding 
that the District Court placed too high a standard on the plaintiff’s claim, and remanded the 
case for trial).  
63 See id. 
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Defendants in cases in which the ATS was invoked have argued that only 
government agencies or officials, not individuals, may be subject to liability for 
violations of the law of nations under the ATS.  However, the Second Circuit 
dispelled that argument in the 1995 case of Kadic v. Karadzic, which established that 
non-state actors could be held liable for international law violations.64  In Kadic, 
Muslim and Croat citizens of Bosnia brought suit against the self-proclaimed 
president of the republic of “Srpska” for rape, torture, forced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, and summary execution.65  The plaintiffs claimed that all of these abuses 
constituted genocide and war crimes in violation of the law of nations.66  The Second 
Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New  
 
York holding that “acts committed by non-state actors do not violate the law of 
nations.”
67  The court reasoned that the modern-era law of nations’ reach is not 
confined to state action, fundamentally, because the probation against piracy is an 
early example of the law of nations’ applicability to private individuals.
68  Most 
importantly, the Second Circuit found that “certain forms of conduct violate the law 
of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as 
private individuals.”
69   
 The Kadic court reasoned that private individuals could be held liable for 
violations of international law because certain specific types of abuses are so bad that 
they are within the scope of the ATS, regardless of who committed them.70  The 
court found that genocide and war crimes do not require state action and individuals 
may therefore be liable under the ATS for such offenses.71  Although torture and 
summary executions do require state action, private individuals may be held liable if 
acting in concert with a state.72  Thus, the Kadic court essentially set forth the criteria 
under which private individuals may be held liable under the ATS.  Private 
individuals may be held liable (1) for commissions of war crimes and acts of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37. 
65 Id. at 236. 
 
66 Id. 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 Id. at 239. 
 
69 Id.  
70 See generally id.  
 
71 Id. 
 
72 See id. at 239, 241-45.  The Second Circuit instructed that acts of genocide and war 
crimes automatically warrant ATS jurisdiction, while other abuses may fall under ATS 
jurisdiction if they were done in concert with some associated official action.  Here, the 
court opened the door for ATS liability (and inferably corporate liability) under the 
important aider and abettor doctrine, which I discuss in further detail later in this article. 
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genocide;73 and (2) for working the commission of other human rights abuses, if 
done in concert with a state actor.74 
ATS cases that address the issue of whether private individuals may be found 
liable for human rights violations, such as Kadic and cases that follow, unanimously 
conclude that the courts may exercise jurisdiction in these scenarios.75  The Kadic 
court did not base its holding, which has become universally accepted in the U.S., on 
any express term in the statute or International tribunal.  Rather, it found that certain 
acts constituted violations of the law of nations and therefore subjected its actors 
(regardless of whether they were state or private individuals) to liability under the 
ATS.76  Applying this rationale, the criteria under which private individuals may be 
subject to ATS liability must include corporations as well. 
 In the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber 
Co., the court relied in part on Kadic to determine that the law of nations obliged the 
court to decide how to enforce the substantive obligations imposed by international 
law.77  The Flomo plaintiffs brought an ATS suit against the Firestone, alleging that 
the defendant utilized “hazardous child labor” on its 118,000-acre rubber plantation 
in Liberia.78  The plaintiffs alleged that the use of such labor practices violated the 
law of nations.  The court ultimately concluded that the record was not sufficient to 
infer a violation of international law and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.
79  
The court nevertheless held, in relevant part, that corporations may be held liable 
under the ATS.80 
In Kadic the significance of the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the private 
individual simply lies in that it was the first time a U.S. court exercised jurisdiction 
over any defendant other than a state actor.  There was nothing in the decision that 
distinguished private individuals from corporations in any way, except for the 
reference to piracy as an originally contemplated norm for which the ATS was 
enacted, and a case that reflected this norm.81  However, in 1789, large multinational 
corporations did not exist as they commonly do today.  If they had existed, and a 
case was brought against such a corporation, the courts of the day may very well 
have ruled in a similar fashion against it.  Furthermore, there has never been any 
distinction between an “aider and abettor” and a corporation.  To the contrary, the 
Second Circuit establishes the standard for aiding and abetting in an ATS case that 
involved a corporate defendant, thus making the Kiobel court’s holding that  
 
 
                                                 
73 Id. at 239. 
 
74 Id. at 245. 
 
75 See generally Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244; Pfizer, 562 F.3d 
163; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254; Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d. 233 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
 
76 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
77 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020. 
 
78 Id. at 1015. 
79 Id. at 1023-24. 
 
80 Id. at 1021, 1025 (“Having satisfied ourselves that corporate liability is possible under the 
[ATS] . . . .”).  
 
81 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.  
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corporations are not subject to international law one that is contradictory to accepted 
precedent set in the very same circuit and without meaningful precedent. 
 
C. Corporations May be Held Liable under the Aiding and Abetting Doctrine 
 
It is clear from case law precedent that ATS liability under the aiding and 
abetting doctrine extends to corporate defendants.  Although the exact standard by 
which parties may be found liable in ATS cases under the aiding and abetting 
doctrine is not clear, courts have generally found that corporations may be held liable 
for aiding and abetting international law violations.82  The concept of aiding and 
abetting liability is critical in the ATS context, because in order for the ATS to 
provide jurisdiction, the defendant must have allegedly committed a violation of 
international law.83  Except under extreme circumstances, only government officials 
could commit violations of the law of nations.84  For that reason, unless a private 
individual or corporation embarks upon genocide or committing war crimes, no 
violation of international law could be found.  The aiding and abetting doctrine is 
thus an integral arm of the ATS in that it brings private parties that act in concert 
with the government within the scope of liability. 
The differing standards by which courts are to consider whether a corporation 
may be held liable under the aider and abettor doctrine are set forth in two Second 
Circuit cases.  In Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., a group of plaintiffs brought 
suit against numerous corporate defendants under the ATS, alleging that the 
defendants “actively and willingly collaborated with the government of South 
Africa”
85 in maintaining Apartheid, the racially-based system of repression that 
benefited South Africa’s minority White population, while restricting the majority 
Black population “in all areas of life.”
86  The Second Circuit overturned a district 
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ ATS claims, holding that the district court erred in 
finding that ATS jurisdiction could not be based on aiding and abetting international 
law violations.87   
In his concurring opinion of Khulumani, Judge Katzmann first cautions against 
confusing the cause of action inquiry set forth in Sosa v. Alvarez-Mcain with the 
jurisdictional analysis under the ATS.88  Judge Katzmann also found that the concept 
of aiding and abetting liability is “well established” international criminal law  
 
 
                                                 
82 Gallagher, supra note 60, at 750. 
83 See generally ATS, supra note 1. 
 
84 See generally, Kadic, 70 F.3d 232. 
 
85 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258. 
 
86 Id. at 260. 
87 Id.  See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
88 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264.  Judge Katzmann, in criticizing the district court’s dismissal 
of plaintiff’s claims, stated that: “[the district court’s analysis] conflated the jurisdictional 
and cause of action analyses required by the ATCA. As a result, the district court 
mistakenly incorporated a discretionary analysis into the determination of whether it has 
jurisdiction under the ATCA. Second, it erroneously held that aiding and abetting liability 
does not exist under international law.”   
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tribunals, and that international law provides the primary source for determining the 
scope of liability.89  Thus, who should be held liable under the aider and abettor  
theory should be governed by international law, the standard being “substantial 
assistance.”
90  Judge Katzmann concluded that aider and abettor liability was so 
“well established and universally recognized to be considered customary 
international law for purposes of the [ATS],”
91 and that a defendant may be held 
liable when the defendant “(1) provides practical assistance to the principal which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does so with the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”92 
Judge Hall also gave a concurring opinion in Khulumani, in which he, like Judge 
Katzmann, recognized that the courts should look to international law to define 
primary liability under the ATS.93  However, Judge Hall found that the courts should 
look to federal common law in defining a standard by which defendants may be held 
liable under an aider and abettor theory.94  Judge Hall defined aiding and abetting as 
“knowingly and substantially assisting the commission of a violation of customary 
international law.”
95  Unlike Judge Katzmann’s standard, this does not require that  
                                                 
89 Id. at 270-72. Aider and abettor liability has long been recognized in numerous 
international treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
statutes creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). Specifically, the London 
Charter, which established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following the 
second World War extended individual liability for aiding and abetting war crimes, 
specifically stating that “accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit” any of the crimes triable by the Tribunal would be 
held responsible.  See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, E.A.S. 472. 
90 Id. at 270, 277.  Equally applicable to the question of whether international law extends 
liability to non-state actors is where to look to determine whether the scope of liability for a 
violation of international law should extend to aiders and abettors. “[W]hether a norm is 
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action” raises a “related consideration [of] 
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, n. 20. 
91 See Kadic, 70 F.3d 232. 
92 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted).  It is 
important to note that under Judge Katzmann’s standard, mere knowledge that the 
assistance given to the principle furthered the commission of a violation of an international 
norm is not sufficient to invoke liability under the ATS.   
93 Id. at 286-87. 
 
94 Id. at 284.  This differs substantially from Judge Katzmann’s conclusion that international 
law should be the source for determining both what violations invoke primary liability 
under the ATS (against the actual perpetrator), as well as the standard by which accessorial 
liability may be imposed (against the aider and abettor).  
95 Id. at 287-89; Gallagher, supra note 60, at 763 (emphasis added).  Judge Hall adopts the 
holding in Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which stated the elements 
of aiding and abetting: “(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act 
that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an 
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the 
defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.”  Halberstam, 
705 F.2d, at 477. 
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the defendant’s purpose was to assist the violation.   Knowledge that the assistance 
the defendant provided to the principal was being used to aid in the commission of 
an international law violation is sufficient to hold the defendant liable under this 
view.  Conversely, Judge Katzmann’s standard imposes a heightened mens rea 
requirement, in that the assistance provided to the principal must have been “with the  
purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”
96  Under Judge Katzmann’s 
view, it must be the intent of the aiding party to facilitate the wrongdoing for aiding 
and abetting liability to be imposed, whereas Judge Hall merely requires 
awareness.97 
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, the Second Circuit 
recognized that plaintiffs could seek relief for violations of international norms under 
the aider and abettor doctrine, but that the court was split as to what the standard for 
pleading such liability was or should be.98  Talisman Energy Co. was a Canadian 
energy company that participated in a consortium with three other oil companies and 
the Sudanese government for the exploration, production, and development of oil in 
Sudan in the 1990’s and early 2000’s.
99  Together, the Sudanese government and 
consortium built all-weather roads to and from the oil concession areas, and  
upgraded two airstrips, which were used exclusively by the military.100  The 
Sudanese military and government-sponsored militias provided security for the 
companies’ oil operations.
101  In the process of “securing” the oil concessions, the 
security forces displaced, assaulted, and shot at civilians who lived in nearby 
villages, and bombed them regularly.102  The plaintiffs in this case alleged that 
Talisman aided and abetted the Sudanese government in violating customary 
international law.103   
For the purpose of creating binding legal precedent and to dispose the confusion 
that necessarily arose out of the panel split in Khulumani, the Talisman court adopted 
the standard for aider and abettor liability set forth in Judge Katzmann’s concurrence 
as the law of the Second Circuit.104  The court recognized that Talisman knowingly  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Gallagher, supra note 60, at 763. 
 
97 Id. 
 
98 Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 258. 
99 Id. 
 
100 Id. at 249. 
 
101 Id. at 249-50. 
 
102 Id.  
 
103 Id. at 251. 
 
104 Id. The court recognized that although Judges Katzmann and Korman agreed that “the 
standard for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS must derive from international law 
sources” in the judges’ concurrence and dissent respectively, Judge Katzmann’s concurring 
opinion nevertheless did not constitute a holding and is therefore not binding precedent.  
See Gallagher, supra note 60, at 765. 
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and substantially assisted the Sudanese government.105  Nevertheless, the court 
ultimately dismissed the claims because the plaintiffs could not show that Talisman 
purposefully aided the government in committing any of the human rights 
violations.106  Relying on international law as the source of the standard for aiding  
and abetting liability, the Talisman court held that defendants who purposefully aid 
and abet a violation of international law may be held liable under the ATS.107 
As noted above, the Talisman court held that ATS liability could be imposed if 
the plaintiffs could prove the elements of aiding and abetting, and clarified the 
standard for liability under the aiding and abetting doctrine was made law, in the 
context of a corporate defendant.  Yet, in Kiobel, the Second Circuit distinguishes 
corporate liability and aiding and abetting liability as two separate jurisdictional 
categories.108  In relying on precedent that establishes that corporations may be held 
liable for ATS violations through the aider and abettor doctrine, while at the same 
time holding that there can be no corporate liability under the ATS, the Kiobel court 
creates an inconsistency within the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit and others, 
which removes the ability of legal professionals to accurately identify what the state 
of the law is.  
 
D. Neither the Text of the ATS, or U.S. Common Law                                                               
Make Corporations Per-Se Immune from Liability 
 
The text of the ATS places no limitation as to who may be brought as a defendant 
under the ATS, therefore placing no prohibition on corporations being subject to 
liability under the ATS.109  In Romero v. Drummond Co., the Eleventh Circuit 
expressly rejected a corporate-defendant’s argument that the ATS doesn’t allow suits 
against corporations.110  In Romero, a Columbian labor union and relatives of 
deceased union workers brought suit against the Columbian subsidiary of a U.S. coal 
mining company.111  The complaint alleged that executives of the defendant-
corporation recruited paramilitary forces to torture and murder union leaders.112  The 
court held, in relevant part, that the ATS contains no express exceptions for 
corporations, and therefore “grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against 
corporate defendants.”113 
U.S. ATS jurisprudence has long recognized that corporations are capable of 
committing substantial human rights violations and should therefore be held liable  
 
 
                                                 
105 Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 262-63. 
 
106 Id. at 261-62. 
 
107 Id. at 259. 
108 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129. 
 
109 See generally ATS, supra note 1. 
110 Romero, 552 F.3d 1303. 
111 Id. at 1309. 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 Id. at 1315. 
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for those violations.  In 1907, The U.S. Attorney General rendered an opinion in a 
matter involving a U.S. corporation and Mexican nationals.114  The Attorney General  
stated that the corporation could be held liable if its actions injured “the substantial 
rights of citizens of Mexico under the principles of international law or by treaty.”
115  
More recently, in the case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., the Second Circuit held that a 
prohibition on nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings constituted 
a universally accepted norm of customary international law, and consequently the  
alleged violation committed by the defendant corporation thereof fell within purview 
of the ATS.116  Furthermore, in Talisman, the Second Circuit adopted a standard 
under which corporations may be held liable under the ATS.117  Although the court 
held that mere knowledge that a corporation’s actions contributed to the commission 
of a human rights violation is insufficient, it nevertheless found that corporations 
may be held liable if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that the corporation purposefully 
had such an involvement.118 
Those in opposition to corporate liability under the ATS have cited no authority 
that states that corporations are per se immune or exempt from liability under the 
ATS.119  As pointed out by Judge Leval in his concurring opinion in Kiobel: “[n]o  
court has ever dismissed a civil suit against a corporation, which alleged a violation 
of the laws of nations, on the ground that juridical entities [such as corporations] 
have no legal responsibility or liability under that law.”
120  Many corporate-
defendants that have found themselves on the defending end of ATS litigation have 
successfully had the claims brought against them dismissed.  However, with the 
exception of the defendant-corporation in Kiobel, none of these corporations 
received these favorable rulings solely because their existence as corporations made 
them immune from ATS liability or international law.  Conversely, numerous ATS 
cases involving corporate defendants were dismissed because the plaintiffs either 
failed to properly state their clams, or failed prove that the corporation actually 
violated a law of nations.121   
In holding that corporations are not subject to international law and therefore 
cannot be held liable under the ATS, the Kiobel court relied on no positive authority 
which supported such a conclusion.  Instead, the court looked past U.S. ATS cases 
that impliedly suggest, if not expressly state, that corporations can be held liable 
under the ATS, if the necessary elements are satisfied in the plaintiffs’ pleadings.  
The accepted interpretation as to what the drafters of the Act contemplated is of what 
types of actions may be brought under the ATS and whom the Act was intended to  
                                                 
114 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 162. 
115 Id. 
116 Pfizer, 562 F.3d at 188. 
117 See generally Drimmer & Lieberman, supra note 11; see generally Talisman Energy, 
582 F.3d at 260-64 (In a case involving numerous corporate defendants, the court adopts 
Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in Khulumani, which set the standard by which 
defendants in ATS suits may be held liable under the aider and abettor doctrine); 
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 287-89. 
118 Id. 
119 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 160, 161. 
120 Id. 
121 See Romero, 552 F.3d 1303; Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244; Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh 
Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005); Flores, 414 F.3d. 233.   
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protect.122  Nothing in the ATS or any of the early cases demonstrates that the 
drafters or early courts intended for the scope of the ATS to extend to government  
officials as well as private individuals, but not corporations.  Although there have 
been few, if any, outright victories for plaintiffs who bring suits against corporations  
under the ATS, courts have clearly indicated that they intend for the possibility of 
corporate liability to remain open.   
 
IV. THE KIOBEL CASE 
 
A. Background 
 
 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the plaintiffs, who were residents 
of Nigeria, brought suit against three oil companies, alleging that the companies 
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human rights abuses.123  
The plaintiffs claimed that these abuses violated the law of nations.124  The plaintiffs 
claimed that Nigerian military forces shot and killed, beat, raped, and arrested 
members of their village.125  The plaintiffs also claimed that the military forces 
destroyed and looted their property.126  The plaintiffs alleged that the corporate 
defendants aided the abuse by providing transportation to the forces, allowed the 
forces to utilize their property to stage attacks, and compensated soldiers for the 
attacks.127  The Second Circuit did not decide whether these defendants were liable 
under the aiding and abetting doctrine, because it found that corporate defendants 
were categorically excluded from liability under international law.128  The court 
ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims because the ATS did not provide 
jurisdiction over the corporate defendants.129 
The majority opinion in Kiobel simply and directly held that federal courts had no 
jurisdiction over corporations under the ATS.130  The Second Circuit identified that it  
had looked to international law in determining that government officials, private 
individuals, and aiders and abettors can be held liable under the ATS, and that a 
similar inquiry ought to be performed to determine whether corporations can be held 
liable.131  This court first looked to international criminal tribunals, particularly the 
post-World War II Nuremburg Tribunal proceedings to determine what the state of 
international law was pertaining to corporations.132  The court specifically identified 
what is commonly referred to as the “Farben Case,” where the International Military  
 
                                                 
122 See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
123 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117. 
 
124 Id. at 123. 
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128 Id. at 149. 
 
129 Id. at 147. 
 
130 Id. at 145. 
131 Id. at 130.  
132 Id. at 132. 
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Tribunal charged twenty-four of I.G. Farben’s executives with various war crimes, 
but did not “charge” the corporate entity.
133  Furthermore, although the court did  
properly acknowledge that treaties are a proper source for determining the state of 
international law, and many of them impose liability on corporations, it nevertheless 
held that such treaties do not create a customary international norm that establishes 
that corporations are subject to international law.134 
 
B. Where the Kiobel Court Went Wrong 
 
The Kiobel opinion was wrong on three main fronts.  First, the court 
acknowledged that private parties can be liable for violations of international law 
under the aiding and abetting doctrine, but concluded that corporations could not.135   
Any party aiding and abetting a violation of human rights must fundamentally be 
either a private individual or corporation.136  The case law that the Kiobel court 
accepts and cites to as precedent necessarily establishes that corporations may be 
liable under the theory of aiding and abetting, because the court specifically set forth 
the criteria under which the corporate defendant could be held liable under the 
ATS.137  Although the court purported to agree with the holding in Talisman and  
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani, the Kiobel court failed to 
acknowledge the context in which these cases were heard.  Both Talisman and 
Khulumani were cases in which plaintiffs brought claims against corporate  
defendants under the ATS.138  In endorsing the standard for aider and abettor liability 
set forth in Talisman, while at the same time holding that there can be no liability 
imposed against corporate defendants in ATS cases, the Kiobel majority opinion 
created a legal contradiction that should be reconciled. 
The Kiobel opinion referenced cases in which determinations were made as to 
whether particular classes of defendants may be held liable under the ATS.139  The 
rationale in Kiobel reflects a view that “aiders and abettors” are a type of people or 
entity, such as government actors, private individuals, and corporations.  The court 
stated that: “[w]e have looked to international law to determine whether state 
officials . . . private individuals . . . and aiders and abettors . . . can be held liable  
                                                 
133 Id. at 135-36.  I.G. Farben was the German chemical conglomerate that was alleged to 
have substantially assisted Nazi Germany in the development of chemical weaponry during 
World War II.   
134 Id. at 137-39.  
135 See id. at 149. 
 
136 State officials, or individuals acting “under the color of official authority,” are 
established defendants under the ATS, and therefore aiding and abetting liability will not 
come into play in suits brought against them.  See generally Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
137 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129 (acknowledging Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in 
Khulumani as the law of the Second Circuit, and proper mechanism for analyzing ATS 
claims under the aiding and abetting doctrine).  See generally Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 
258 (adopting Judge Katzmann’s analysis in his Khulumani concurrence and finding that 
corporations may be subject to ATS liability upon the plaintiffs’ successful demonstration 
that the corporation provided practical assistance that has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of a crime, with the purpose of facilitating that crime). 
138 Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244; Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254 (plaintiffs bringng ATS suit 
against numerous corporate defendants for assisting and furthering apartheid in South 
Africa).   
139 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129. 
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under the ATS.”
140 However, in doing so, the court misapplied the analysis set forth 
in those cases and drew a conclusion that was hardly supported by the opinions of 
either of the foregoing cases.   
Second, the court acknowledged that private individuals could be held liable 
under the ATS, but failed to apply the reasoning upon which that determination was 
based.141  The Kiobel court acknowledged the precedent set by Kadic, but 
disregarded the manner in which the Kadic court arrived at its conclusion.142  The 
Kiobel court stated that international tribunals have never exercised jurisdiction over 
corporations, therefore corporate liability has not risen to the level of an international 
norm.143  It is true that U.S. courts have looked to international criminal law to help 
show which norms have “definite content” and “widespread acceptance” to 
constitute what actions violate the law of nations.144  However, while also 
recognizing treaties as a source for determining international law, the court placed 
little significance on the many treaties that impose obligations on corporations.145 
As Judge Leval stated in his concurring opinion, international tribunals have 
never imposed any civil liability over any sort of private actor.146  It is therefore a 
premature conclusion that corporations are, generally, not subject to international 
law, especially in light of the existence of treaties that impose specific obligations on 
corporations.  The Kiobel court bases its decision largely on the Nuremburg  
Tribunals, which took place before the doctrine of aiding and abetting liability was 
established.147  It is universally recognized that courts must rely on international law 
as it has evolved in making determinations of jurisdiction under the ATS.148    
Lastly, the court erred in finding that corporations, as a general rule, were not 
subject to international law.  The court stated that corporations couldn’t be held 
liable under the ATS because corporate liability does not constitute an international 
norm.149  Such an argument presents a noteworthy gap in logic because it compares 
corporate liability to established international laws, which prohibit “genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.”
150  Corporate liability is not and cannot be a  
 
                                                 
140 Id. at 130. 
141 Id. at 129; see generally Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (imposing ATS liability to private 
individuals because certain violations of international law are so heinous, that the defendant 
may be liable, although the defendant was not a public official). 
 
142 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130. 
143 Id. at 135. 
144 Gallagher, supra note 60, at 748. 
145 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 139. 
146 Id. at 160 n.11.  
147 The Nuremberg Tribunals followed WWII.  Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244, although 
not the first case to discuss the doctrine, set the standard for aiding and abetting liability was 
decided in 2009. 
148 See generally Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (following Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876). 
149 Id. at 4145-6.   
150 See Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d at 257 n. 7. 
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“norm” in the sense that it is not conduct.  Violations of international law norms are 
actionable in courts.  How is “corporate liability” to be violated?  Corporate liability  
is merely a term attached to holding corporations accountable in court for their 
violations of international law norms.  Furthermore, the opinions from which the 
Kiobel court drew did not turn on whether liability for a particular group of actors  
constituted a “norm.”  Rather, these cases considered whether a class of defendants 
could be found liable for violating an international law norm.151   
How could the Second Circuit rely on these cases for the substantive aiding and 
abetting standard for ATS liability, yet ignore the fact that every one of those cases 
involved corporate defendants, and ultimately find that corporations cannot be held 
liable under the ATS?  The Kiobel court reasoned that a footnote in the Sosa opinion 
instructed courts to look at international law to determine whether international law 
extended the scope of liability of a violation to the perpetrator being sued if the 
defendant is a private individual or corporation.152  Even though the Kiobel court 
inquired whether international law extended the scope of liability to corporations, 
and somehow managed to exclude corporate defendants from liability under the 
aiding and abetting doctrine, it nonetheless erred in finding that corporations are not 
subject to international law.153   
After World War II, “the allied powers dissolved German corporations that had 
assisted the Nazi war effort,” and did so under the authority of customary 
international law.154  Additionally, all the assets of I.G. Farben were seized by the  
allied powers when the company was found to have “knowingly and prominently 
engaged in building up and maintaining the German war potential.”
155  Corporations 
cannot be thrown in jail, nor can individual officers be held civilly liable for the 
actions of all of its employees.  However, the fact that the allied powers dissolved 
this corporation and made some of its assets available for reparations, under the 
authority of international law, for the corporation’s assistance to the German war 
effort clearly demonstrates corporations are indeed subject to international law.  
Because corporations are subject to international law, the entire U.S. aiding and 
abetting jurisprudence as relates to the ATS involves corporate defendants, the law 
of nations is ever evolving, and no court prior to or since Kiobel has held that 
corporations, categorically, are excluded from ATS liability, the Kiobel court simply 
got it wrong. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been said that broad liability under the ATS could open the door for many 
frivolous lawsuits and consequently stifle investment and competition of U.S.  
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multinational corporations abroad.156  It has also been said that corporations 
operating abroad will not know what behavior is acceptable under international law,  
and cause even more confusion under the ATS.  In reality, courts have been very 
strict in limiting the reach of the ATS to allegations of very specific human rights 
violations.  Furthermore, courts have demonstrated that it is extremely difficult for a 
plaintiff to win an ATS case on the merits because such an outcome has yet to be 
reached.  However, courts have been equally careful to ensure that meritous claims 
brought against corporations under the ATS are heard.   
 If the Second Circuit is permitted to ban corporate liability under the ATS, 
it would do so going against the greater weight of authority which demonstrates that 
corporations are not exempt from liability under the ATS, and eliminate a 
meaningful check on how corporations conduct business overseas.  Although there 
have been no outright victories for plaintiffs in ATS cases against corporate 
defendants, there have been numerous instances in which courts have refused to rule 
out the possibility of corporate ATS liability.  Furthermore, there have been a 
number of major cases that have settled outside of court, even on the eve of trial, 
after multiple failed attempts by the defendant corporation to have plaintiffs’ ATS 
claims dismissed.157  This demonstrates that corporations are fearful of what the 
outcome of trial could be and would rather not risk such a loss.  Without the 
possibility of liability, corporations will have no incentive to settle ATS cases, and 
victims of terrible human rights violations will potentially be left without any 
redress, simply because the actor was a powerful corporation and not a government 
officer or another private individual.  Furthermore, if this is permitted to remain 
positive law, corporations will be encouraged to engage in whatever conduct that  
might have a positive impact on its business, regardless of whether its conduct 
furthers violations of individuals’ fundamental rights. 
Prior to its holding in Kiobel, the law of the Second Circuit was that Corporations 
could be held liable under the ATS for purposely aiding and abetting human rights 
violations.  However, while acknowledging that precedent purporting to uphold it, 
the Kiobel court held that corporations could not be held liable under the ATS.158  
This holding comes in direct contrast to the precedent set in Talisman.159   
U.S. corporations, attorneys, judges, students, and scholars are all in need of a 
conclusive, authoritative statement of what the law is.  All circuit courts of appeals 
presented with the issue of corporate liability under the ATS have held that 
corporations may be found liable when certain specific criteria are met.  The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. less than a 
month after the Second Circuit issued its Kiobel decision.  This indicates that the 
Court intends for corporate liability under the ATS to remain a possibility.160  The 
U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Kiobel case, apparently 
recognizing the need for clarity among the circuit courts.161  The Supreme Court  
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should reverse the Kiobel holding that corporations may not be held liable under the 
ATS, and provide much needed and long awaited clarity on the issue. 
 
 
  
